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ABSTRACT 
Public choice theory provides a parsimonious explanation of changes in public policy, 
yet there is little systematic data available about the major beneficiaries of patent 
systems. This paper uses data from the US and Australia to identify those companies 
which own the largest number of patents from applications made between 1990 and 
2001. In both countries the 100 companies owning the most patents own about one-third 
of all patents owned by organisations. Forty-six companies—many of them household 
names—are among both the top 100 US patenters and the top 100 Australian patenters. 
Forty-six companies are on both lists. Among the top 100 US patenters, 43 are US-
based. In Australia only one of the top 100 patenters is an Australian company. Major 
patenters are selective in the technologies they patent in Australia—few semi-conductor 
companies take out Australian patents, while pharmaceuticals and chemicals have a 
larger share than in the USA. 
Twelve of the 13 companies that played a major role in the development of the TRIPS 
agenda have been among the top 100 US patenters. However data on the top 10 US 
patenters from 1969 to 2006 show that since the mid 1980s—the very time when US 
patent policy was extending to achieve a global reach—overseas companies replaced 
US companies as the dominant US patenters.  
 
 
* I would like to thank the Crawford School for financial assistance to attend the European 
Consortium for Political Research Conference in Rennes (France) in April 2008. An earlier version of this 
paper was presented there at Workshop 14, The Politics of Intellectual Property. I would also like to thank 
participants at that workshop for comment on and critique of the original version.  
 
This paper has been accepted as a chapter in a forthcoming book. The full title and bibliographic entry for 
the book is The Politics of Intellectual Property: Contestation over the Ownership, Use, and Control of 
Knowledge and Information, edited by Sebastian Haunss and Kenneth C. Shadlen (Edward Elgar, 2009 
forthcoming).  
© Moir, 2008.  
1 
 
Who benefits?  
An empirical analysis of Australian and US patent ownership  
Introduction 
The US patent system has been substantially strengthened since the early 1980s, and this 
stronger patent regime has spread to other countries both through borrowings in case law, 
and through trade diplomacy. This strengthening has occurred despite growing empirical 
evidence that, outside of pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals, patents are entirely 
unnecessary to obtain a good return on investments in research and development.1 It has 
also occurred despite the general trend towards de-regulation (Landes and Posner 2004).  
The longer duration of patents, and the requirement that they be granted for many subject 
matters previously excluded, has spread worldwide due to pressure by the US government. 
This US policy is attributable to the influence of a small number of corporate players. The 
story about the role of a handful of major companies in the inclusion of regulatory patent 
laws into "free trade" negotiations is well-told elsewhere (Drahos 1995; Ryan 1998; Drahos 
2002; Sell 2003). Public choice theory, particularly rent-seeking and regulatory capture, 
provides a parsimonious explanation of these changes in patent policy.2 A small number of 
entities benefit considerably from strong patent laws, and a large dispersed group pays 
lower, and largely hidden, costs. The focus of this paper is on identifying the small number 
of major beneficiaries. 
It is not widely known that patent policy is based on the needs and interests of a very 
narrow segment of the community, though this has been documented for a considerable 
period of time (Edwards 1949). National Innovation Surveys confirm that only a minority 
of innovating firms use the patent system.3 Patent renewal data show that only a tiny 
proportion of patents generate substantial private returns. The large and growing patent 
system thus benefits only a very small proportion of innovators. Those corporate interests 
which benefit substantially have been successful in hiding their direct material interests 
behind a wide range of claims and propaganda about the alleged general benefits of patent 
systems. These unsubstantiated claims include that inventions will not occur without 
legislated patent monopolies, that the major beneficiaries of patent systems are small 
businesses and individual inventors, and that imitation involves theft.  
                                                 
1  Full documentation of this point – that there is no general failure in the market for innovation – would 
take a book in itself. The interested reader could consult Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998; Scherer 2006 for brief 
summaries of the empirical evidence, or Boldrin and Levine 2008 for an exposition of the role of competition 
in driving innovation. 
2  While some changes are due to judicial decisions – such as the extension of patent coverage to life forms 
and software – legislators could have over-ridden these judicial changes in policy, were it not for the 
regulatory capture of patent offices and very effective lobbying of democratically elected representatives by 
the beneficiaries of a broader and stronger patent system.  
3  For example only 17 percent of innovating European firms use the patent system (Eurostat 2004), and 
only 4.4 percent of innovating Australian firms hold any patents (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005). 
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These allegations run counter to the few available facts about patent systems. There is 
broad empirical evidence that, except for a narrow range of industries where technology is 
highly codified,4 most industrial innovation would occur absent patents.5 Imitation is the 
foundation of learning and involves considerable time and investment (Mansfield et al. 
1981; Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Mandeville 1996). Imitation – and the improvement 
which so often accompanies it – is a cornerstone of competitive markets.  
The patent system is an excellent example of public choice theory – a small number of 
parties benefit significantly from the intervention, but costs are widely dispersed across the 
community. The beneficiaries thus have a strong incentive to lobby for the continuation and 
strengthening of the system.6 The motivation for Bessen and Meurer’s book on patent 
failure was that ‘patent policy has long been the domain of those entrenched interests who 
have the most to gain from patents’ (Bessen and Meurer 2008: 257).  
This paper addresses a very specific question – who are the companies most likely to be 
beneficiaries of the patent system? Identifying these key actors is a critical first step in 
assessing their impact and evaluating any possibilities for creating more balance in policy 
consideration. Of course, another major beneficiary group is Patent Attorneys, and they too 
play a major role in the formulation of patent policy. Investigating the role of Patent 
Attorneys lies well beyond the scope of this short paper. Here it is simply noted that the 
ratio of intellectual property lawyers to $US billions spent on research and development 
(R&D) has increased from under 45 in 1970 to about 75 in the late 1990s (Barton 2000). 
The total cost to the community of this government-backed monopoly system may well 
exceed the benefits to the few. However, most losers individually face low and hidden 
costs, so there is no incentive for them to mount countervailing pressure on politicians.7 A 
close parallel is tariff policy. However it is relatively easy to estimate the community cost 
of high tariff protection, and public interest groups have been successful in many countries 
in negotiating reduced tariff barriers.8 It is harder conceptually to measure the costs of 
patent intervention, and fewer data are available on which to base any such estimates.  
In addition to this direct lobbying effect, there is substantial evidence of regulatory capture 
of patent offices – they have been “captured” by the industry they are designed to regulate. 
                                                 
4  That is, substantially reduced to written form. 
5  This large empirical literature is summarised in Moir (forthcoming). The evidence was originally 
developed in the USA, but has been replicated in a number of European studies. Major references are Taylor 
and Silberston 1973; Mansfield et al. 1981; Mansfield 1986; Levin et al. 1987; Cohen et al. 2000. Beyond 
these specific studies, data from National Innovation Surveys confirm that patents are generally reported by 
business to be the least effective means of ensuring a return to innovation (see e.g. Eurostat 2004; Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2005).  
6  Shadlen demonstrates how this asymmetry in interests influence intellectual policy outcomes in three 
Latin American countries (Shadlen 2008); Oh and Gay provide data on the very large sums that 
pharmaceutical companies spend lobbying (Oh and Gay 2008: 7).  
7  Who might, from some frames of reference, be expected to protect the public interest without the need 
for any such lobbying. 
8  That the cost to a community of protecting a given sized industry is far lower when funded by direct 
subsidy than by tariff barriers is part of any first-year undergraduate economics course. In Australia the Tariff 
Board, later replaced by the Industry Commission and then the Productivity Commission, published a number 
of studies on individual industries, documenting the difference in these costs. This factual work was important 
in generating sufficient political support to dismantle high tariff barriers, often on a unilateral basis.  
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This capture appears to have happened at the very time patent offices have become 
responsible for advising executive government on patent policy. This likelihood was noted 
in a paper presented to the 1984 Australian review of the patent system (Beggs 1981). More 
recently Thambisetty has pointed to the isolation and self-reinforcing culture of patent 
office decisions (Thambisetty 2008), and Drahos has shown how the influence of one 
patent office can flow through to other countries (Drahos 2007). Where patent offices also 
operate as an important layer of the legal appeal system, as with the European Patent Office 
(EPO), such regulatory capture explains decisions that seem otherwise inexplicable.9 
Ideally this paper would focus on identifying both the winners and the losers of patent 
systems. However the extreme dearth of useful patent data makes it impossible to estimate 
the losers in any systematic way. Boldrin and Levine (2008) document a number of major 
cases where patents were used to prevent or delay the development of new technologies, 
and to extract significant monopoly rents. The earliest documented case is James Watt’s 
steam engine; more recent examples include airplane manufacture in the USA, radio 
development in Europe, and electricity.10 These examples are well known. Their cost to the 
community can be considerable. Less frequently noted is the fact that the patent holder in 
these cases was often not the most significant inventor, and in some cases contributed only 
marginal modifications (Boldrin and Levine 2008).  
The literature on the costs of patent systems is very small (Cole 2001). Bessen and Meurer 
recently suggested that a major unrecognised cost of patent systems is that of establishing 
clear boundaries to granted monopolies. This cost has become so high that it is not rational 
to even attempt to determine where the boundaries are. So the likelihood of inadvertent 
infringement has soared, and the risk of litigation increased. They estimate that, excluding 
pharmaceutical firms, the private cost of the patent system now exceeds the private benefit 
for publicly listed US firms (Bessen and Meurer 2008).  
Beyond reporting on these studies it is simply not possible to assess the cost of patent 
systems with currently available data. The principal input necessary for such estimates 
would be the proportion of patents used. No such data are available.11 Losers, of course, are 
not limited to users of the patent system. Any innovating firm, whether or not it uses the 
patent system, can potentially lose because of the patent system. These losses take several 
                                                 
9  The story of the EPO Technical Boards of Appeal lies well beyond the scope of this paper. Bakels and 
Hugenholtz (2002) find no rational basis for their decisions in regard to software, but if the decisions are seen 
from a regulatory capture perspective, the outcomes become more comprehensible. Palombi provides another 
insight into EPO “appeal” decisions in relation to what constitutes an invention (Palombi 2004).  
10  The Seldon car patent, which surfaced in 1903, could have had a similar impact on the US car industry, 
given its very broad scope (an engine on a chassis with four wheels). Henry Ford chose to contest the 
infringement suit, and won after an eight-year legal battle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_B._Selden 
accessed 29 July 2008). Not all companies choose to defend such suits. The benefits of invalidating a patent 
are shared among many firms, so there is a system bias towards “invalid” patents going unchallenged. There 
is the added feature of considerable legal uncertainty. In the famous US Kodak v Polaroid case, Kodak had 
spent considerable resources making sure that it did not contravene the Polaroid patents (Bessen and Meurer 
2008: 50-51). The court did not agree that it had achieved this outcome. Kodak ended up paying US$925 
million in damages, and exiting the instant camera business which had involved $200 million in sunk costs 
and employed 800 full-time and 3,700 part-time staff (Jaffe and Lerner 2004: 113-114).  
11  Collection of such data was recommended in Australia by IPAC (1984), who suggested that firms be 
required to report data on patent use at the time of renewal. This recommendation was never implemented.  
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forms: firms may incur higher costs in “inventing around” a patent; or they may be sued by 
patent holders whose technology is allegedly infringed. In addition consumers can lose 
through the reduced output and higher prices consequent on the use of monopoly power.12  
This paper is thus only able to address the other side of the balance – who benefits. Even 
here data deficiencies severely limit the form in which this question can be asked and 
answered. Nonetheless some partial answers are possible. The focus is on putting names to 
the major users of the patent system, and numbers to the degree to which a large proportion 
of the benefits of any patent system accrues to a very small number of companies.  
This sounds a simple exercise. It has not been done before because of the significant 
challenges in finding patent data in a form that supports policy analysis. While most patent 
offices produce searchable on-line data systems, these are designed to meet the needs of 
patenters and patent attorneys, not policy analysts. There are only limited capacities to 
search these databases for analytically relevant data. Construction of the datasets used in 
this paper, and their limitations are discussed in the Appendix.  
The next section briefly discusses the empirical studies on patent renewal data, which 
demonstrate the extremely skewed distribution of private returns to patenting. These studies 
demonstrate that only a small minority of patented inventions generate the bulk of the 
private returns. While these studies show the extremely skewed distribution, they do not 
identify who owns the most valuable patents.  
Attention is then turned to patenting activity in the USA and Australia. Despite their 
radically different economic situations, there are several similarities in patterns of patent 
usage. This provides useful background to the discussion of major users of the patent 
system. The focus here is on the 100 companies who own a very large share of patents in 
each country. The paper concludes with some thoughts on directions for future research.  
What do we know about patent winners? 
Given the very specific topic investigated here – winners from the patent system – the most 
relevant literature is that on the private value of patents. There is a small but substantial 
empirical literature on this topic. The two main approaches are the analysis of patent 
renewal data, and estimates of the contribution of patents to stock market valuations.13  
Most of the renewals analysis is based on European data as the US patent system does not 
require payment of annual renewal fees. These studies systematically show that the 
distribution of patent values is extremely skewed, with low average returns and a very 
small percentage of patents holding most of the private value from the patent system.  
                                                 
12  Some argue that most patents involve no monopoly power (e.g. Gans et al. 2004), but the corollary of 
this argument is that patents are entirely ineffective. This seems unlikely, given the volume of patenting.  
13  There is also at least one survey-based study (Gambardella et al. 2008). This approach is strongly 
criticised by Bessen and Meurer (2008) as providing inflated estimates, and failing to separate the value of the 
underlying invention from the value of the patent. Given the strong evidence that most inventions would 
occur absent patents, separating the value of the invention from the value of any associated patent is critical. 
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Pakes estimates average gross private returns to French and UK patents as $6000 to 
$7000.14 Germany has a very much lower grant rate (less than half the proportion granted 
in France and the UK), so German patents are likely to be considerably more inventive. 
This is reflected in the higher estimated average value of $16 200. Only 1 percent of patents 
had values over $65 000 in France or the UK or over $118 000 in Germany. Overall half 
the total private value lay with 5 to 10 percent of the granted patents (Pakes 1986: 777-8). 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) find that about half of granted patents were renewed to year 
10, and about half were not.15 They suggest that patents with low private value expire 
quickly, and those renewed to the end of the patent term – about 10 percent – have greatest 
value. Drawing on this work, Griliches (1990) suggests “that though the aggregate value of 
patent rights is quite large, it is only on the order of 10 to 15 percent of the total national 
expenditures on R&D” (Griliches 1990: 1682).  
In an interesting study of 222 patents selected as being of most value,16 Harhoff and 
colleagues find that fully 76 percent of the total gross private value of this set of valuable 
patents rests in just 19 (Harhoff et al. 1998). If these results are generalisable this means 
that the bulk of the value that lies with the top 10 percent of patents actually lies with the 
top 10 percent of that – that is with just 1 percent of patents.  
These empirical studies demonstrate that a very small proportion of patents contribute most 
of the private value. The long tail of granted patents is extremely skewed – even among the 
most valuable patents, a small proportion dominate. The patent system has been likened to 
a lottery, and it seems that, like a lottery, most participants get a very low return on their 
investment. Perhaps traditional economic analysis, focussed as it is on decisions at the 
margin, is not the appropriate basis for analysing such a winner-takes-all market.17  
It must be emphasised that these estimates are not of the total value of the invention, rather 
they attempt to estimate the additional value contributed by holding a patent. Indeed Pakes 
and colleagues conclude that ‘patent protection per se is not the chief means by which firms 
appropriate the returns from their R&D investments’ (Pakes et al. 1989: 362). The other 
strand in research on the private value of patents, also attempts to measure the value of 
patents, abstracting from the value of the underlying inventions. This approach uses 
multivariate statistical techniques to determine the impact of patent holdings on a 
company’s stock market value. Using Australian data Griffiths and Webster find the value 
of patents has been falling over the period 1989 to 2002, but are able only to speculate on 
possible reasons for this (2004). Greenhalgh and Rogers (2004) find a positive value for 
European patent applications, but not for UK patent applications.18 Bessen calculates the 
private value of patents for publicly listed US companies, to generate upper-bound 
                                                 
14  These figures are in 1980 US dollars, using official exchange rates for conversion (Pakes 1986: 768). 
15  In one of the few US renewal studies Thomas, using data on applications from the early 1980s, found 
that 40 percent had a life of eight years or less, and a further 20 percent had a life of 12 years. Just under 40 
percent were renewed for the then full term of 17 years (Thomas 1999). 
16  As patents were sought and granted in both the US and in Germany, and renewal fees were paid to keep 
the German patents in force for their full life. 
17  This theme lies well beyond the boundaries of this paper. For an interesting discussion of winner-take-all 
markets see Frank and Cook 1995.  
18  Except for two sectors (science-based and production-intensive, scale) where firms with more than a 
threshold market share receive a positive return to UK patent applications.  
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estimates and confirm the reliability of valuations derived from renewal data. He estimates 
that a very high proportion of the global gross value of patents—over 80 percent—is owned 
by chemical and pharmaceutical companies, with a large share of this being owned by ‘two 
dozen or so large pharmaceutical companies’ (Bessen 2006: 19).19  
Overall, these studies provide a weight of evidence that the gross private return to the 
average patenter is low. They also show that for a very small minority of patents, private 
values can be extremely high. None of these studies goes on to identify or analyse the firms 
owning the high value patents. 
An overview of patenting in the USA and Australia  
Attention in this section focuses on a different aspect of patent distribution – ownership. 
The discussion is limited to the USA and Australia, and the similarities and contrasts 
between these countries are useful in highlighting several aspects of patent ownership. The 
two economies are quite different in size: the Australian economy is only 6 percent the size 
of the US economy.20 Because of this larger market, the US has a much deeper industrial 
structure, especially in manufacturing. This is despite the recent shifts in production to 
lower cost overseas countries. On the other hand, both countries have high levels of 
education and urbanisation, and strong traditions of innovation.  
By the end of 2007 7,313,828 US patents had been issued and 4,222,954 of these (58 
percent) had been issued in the period from 1963.21 That is, over half of the patents ever 
granted in the USA have been granted within the last 50 years. This astonishing number of 
‘inventions’ is likely to raise queries, in the minds of most readers, about just how inventive 
an invention has to be to be patented.22  
Over the 38 year period 1964 to 2001, the volume of US patent grants increased by 483 
percent. The increase was substantially greater for grants to foreigners (by a factor of more 
than three) than to domestic inventors. So the foreign share of granted patents increased 
from a low of around 20 percent in the early 1960s to reach close to 50 percent by the end 
of the period (see Table 1). The proportion foreign-owned has been quite stable since the 
mid 1980s.  
Foreign ownership of US patents is highly concentrated. Only a small number of countries 
account for the bulk of foreign-held US patents (Figure 1). Until 1972, Germany accounted 
for most overseas-held US patents. In 1973 Japanese inventors became the most prolific  
                                                 
19  The special position with regard to pharmaceutical industries and the patent system has been well-
documented. The higher degree of technological codification, the clearer patent boundaries, and the very high 
cost of Phase III clinical trials combine to suggest that if the patent system operates with a positive net welfare 
effect for any segment of the economy, it is for the pharmaceutical industry. 
20  GDP (expenditure approach, in constant US$s using constant purchasing power parities) data show 
estimated 2006 GDP as US$11,265,200 million in the USA and US$638,227 million in Australia. 
(http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SNA_TABLE1 accessed 25 August 2008).  
21  Throughout this paper references to US patents are references to utility patents (patents of invention) 
only (see Appendix).  
22  There is a voluminous literature on the quantum of inventiveness required for patent patentability. See, 
for example, Lunney 2001; Bagley 2001;  Lunney 2004; Jaffe and Lerner 2004; and Lemley et al. 2005-06.  
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Table 1 US patent grants by residence of first-named inventor 
 US granted patents Share of foreign patents 
Year filed U.S. residents Overseas 
residents 
All grants Foreign 
share 
Japan Germany, 
UK, France, 
Canada 
Other 
countries
1963 195314 47864 243178 20% 7% 65% 27% 
1964-68 201315 68611 269926 25% 13% 60% 26% 
1969-73 223215 104833 328048 32% 22% 53% 25% 
1974-78 206329 123444 329773 37% 27% 48% 25% 
1979-83 185914 136844 322758 42% 37% 43% 21% 
1984-88 202492 182835 385327 47% 43% 38% 19% 
1989-93 275860 232132 507992 46% 48% 32% 20% 
1994-98 410474 338491 748965 45% 46% 29% 25% 
1999-2003 439148 408686 847834 48% 43% 28% 30% 
1964-2001: 
Total granted 
Difference* 
% change 
 
1995022 
71116 
291% 
1450039
84559
1084% 
3445061
155675
483% 
42% 40% 
 
37% 
 
24% 
Source: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_at.htm, Part A2 (accessed 4 March 2008) 
Notes: * Difference in number of grants in 1964 compared to 2001 
Data are by year of filing. Data for 1963 probably include applications filed in earlier years. Long pendency 
rates in processing applications mean that data for 2004-2006 are substantially incomplete. The notes in the 
source suggest a degree of incompleteness as far back as 2000, hence overall data are calculated only until 2001. 
 
foreign patenters in the US. Germany, France the UK and Canada each hold small but 
respectable shares of US patents.23 Overall, 73 percent of US patents held by foreigners are 
held by inventors in five countries, with a further ten countries holding another 10 percent. 
Despite being included in this list, Australia (and Israel, Belgium and Austria) each account 
for less 0.6 percent of US patents. So many countries that rank quite highly in ownership 
have in fact only a tiny share of the market. This is one sense in which patent ownership is 
highly concentrated. On a volume basis the bulk of potential “winners” are companies 
resident in the US, Japan, Germany, the UK, France and Canada.24  
Most patents are owned by companies. Of US grants in the period 1964 to 2003, 82 percent 
are held by companies, less than 2 percent by governments, and 17 percent by individuals. 
The share of individuals is steadily declining – from well over 20 percent in the 1960s to 
around 12 percent in the 2000s. This is largely offset by an increase in corporate patent 
ownership – from 74 percent in the 1960s to 88 percent in the 2000s.  
 
                                                 
23  There is then a drop from 4 percent for Canada to 2.5 percent for Taiwan.  
24  One might therefore anticipate that these five countries would have a positive technology balance of 
payments. But data for 1990 show that the ratio of technology receipts to technology payments was less than 
one (i.e. in deficit) in Japan (0.91), Germany (0.83), the UK (0.96), France (0.76) and Canada (0.93). The 
ratio was strongly positive in the USA (5.26) and was also positive for Sweden (5.47) and Denmark (1.14) 
(Gruen et al. 1996: 9).  
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Figure 1 Residence of inventor/owner of patents granted from applications in 
period 1990 to 2001: USA and Australia 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
US patents Australian patents
ROW
next 10 countries
Canada
France
UK
Germany
Australia
Japan
USA
 
Source: US data calculated from http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (accessed 4 March 2008) 
Australian data calculated from data provided by IPAustralia.  
Notes: Total patents granted from 1990-2001 applications as at end 2007 were 1,811,967 for the USA and 161, 404 for 
Australia. The “next 10 countries” for US patents are Taiwan, Korea, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Israel, Finland, Belgium and Austria. The “next 10 countries” for Australian patents are 
Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Israel, Denmark, Korea, New Zealand, Italy, and Belgium. ROW 
stands for “rest of the world”, i.e. all other countries. 
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So the US patent scene is one where the volume of patenting has "exploded", particularly 
since the mid 1980s.25 Patent ownership is dominated by companies, but foreign 
companies, particularly from Japan, now have a very large share of US patents.  
Although the Australian market is substantially smaller than that of the USA, there are 
some surprising parallels in the patenting experience of the two countries. But first, the 
differences. The overall volume of patenting is much less – 161,404 patents were granted 
from applications between 1990 and 2001, only 9 percent of the 1,811,967 equivalent US 
grants. This is unsurprising given that Australia’s GDP is only 6 percent of that of the USA. 
The proportion of patents owned by foreigners is much higher in Australia than in the USA 
– it has long been the case that ownership of patents in small countries is dominated by 
foreigners (Bates 2003; Lamberton and Mandeville 1980; Penrose 1951).26 Overall 92 
percent of Australian patents are owned by foreigners compared to 47 percent in the USA. 
But the share of patents granted to organisations is similar: 92 percent in Australia 
compared to 88 percent in the USA. In both countries the largest single patent owner group 
is US-based inventors: from 1990 to 2001 applications their share of patents was 53 percent 
in the USA and 43 percent in Australia. While US based inventors hold the largest share of 
US patents, Australian applicants rank only third in Australian patent ownership. With a 
mere 8 percent of patents, Australia is a long way behind the US, with its 43 percent share.  
The degree of concentration in foreign patent ownership is similar to that in the USA—
applicants from the top five countries own 76 percent of Australian patents held by 
overseas residents. As in the USA, applicants from a small number of countries hold almost 
all Australian patents. The USA dominates, then Japan, Germany, the UK and France 
(Figure 1). The next 10 countries hold a greater share of Australian patents than US patents, 
while the “rest of the world” holds a slightly larger share in the USA than in Australia.  
Corporate patenting in the USA and Australia 
The patent renewal literature showed that a tiny percentage of patents hold most of the 
private value. The above discussion shows that the large majority of patents are owned by 
companies, and that residents of only a few countries own the bulk of granted patents in 
both the USA and Australia. The other major patent offices (Europe and Japan) do not seem 
to allow ready access to comparable data. However the WIPO site provides an annual 
summary of Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) statistics, and their latest report indicates that 
                                                 
25  Studies on the massive growth in US patent applications focus on recent decades and so unambiguously 
attribute the explosion in US patent applications to the increase in patenting for US origin patents (Kortum 
and Lerner 1999; Hall 2005). This contrasts with the longer term data presented in this paper which suggest 
that the fastest growth rates have been in grants to foreign applicants. The share of foreign patents has been 
relatively stable since the mid 1980s.  
26  Bates cites 2003 WIPO data for selected countries, showing that the percentage of grants to residents (by 
grant year) is 12.4 in the UK, 15.1 in Sweden, 22.4 in Israel, 40.6 in Germany and 89.2 in Japan. While WIPO 
provides an interesting series on applications by country of grant and residence of owner/inventor (from 1883 
to 2006), there are some difficulties with these data (http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ 
index.html, accessed 15 March 2008). For example, they give the resident share of applications in Australia in 
2006 as 30 percent. IPAustralia data indicate that the relevant figure is 11 percent (calculated from 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/statistics, Table P30(Feb08), accessed 15 March 2008).  
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the four top global patenting countries are Japan, the USA, Germany and Korea, sharing 73 
percent of PCT grants in 2006 (WIPO 2008: 22).  
Newspaper and magazine articles on specific frequent patenters – for example IBM – 
suggest that a few companies may dominate patent ownership. But there has been little 
recent academic interest in the concentration of patent ownership. The sole article 
locatedon this topic was published in 1970, and has never been cited.27 Based on US data 
for three time periods (1921-38, 1939-55 and 1946-62) little increase was found in the 
concentration for the top four, eight and 20 companies. But there was a marked increase in 
concentration for the top 40 companies between 1938 and 1955 (Watson and Holman 1970: 
115). They report the proportion of patents (by grant year) held by the top 100 companies 
rose from 35 percent in 1921-38 to 43 percent in 1939-55 to 46 percent in 1946-62.28  
US patent data on organisations which have been granted 1,000 or more patents are 
available from 1969 to 2006.29 These data show such organisations hold a stable but 
gradually increasing share of patents (35 percent in 1970, 40 percent in 2001). Very few of 
these large patenters are non-profit organisations: of the 340 organisations listed, eight were 
government agencies and 11 were non-profit research institutions.30 Most of the patents 
held by these frequent patenters are held by the top 100 companies, whose share increased 
gradually from 27 to 33 percent. It was the growth in the share of the top 100 patent owners 
which drove the increase in share held by frequent patenters. Overall this frequent patenter 
group owns 45 percent of US patents granted to organisations, or 38 percent of all patent 
grants (Table 2).31 
The concentration of patent ownership in Australia is surprisingly similar. The 100 
companies holding most patents have 34 percent of all patents granted to organisations in 
this 12 year period.32 The Australian data allow some insight into the wider distribution of 
                                                 
27  Based on information from the ISI Web of Knowledge as at 13 March 2008. The authors noted that prior 
to their article there had been considerable interest in industrial concentration, but that the ownership of 
patents had been a neglected topic of study. 
28  The dataset was patents held by all domestic corporations with 200 or more patents at the start of each 
period. The data are by year of grant of patent. Data on all patents granted were from a variety of sources. 
29  These data have one major disadvantage in identifying frequent patenters. If a company chooses to 
patent through a number of subsidiaries, it may not appear on the list even though it own more than 1000 
patents. There are not, however, any alternative readily useable public sources of data on patent ownership. 
This, and other technical aspects of this dataset, are discussed in the Appendix.  
30  The 321 corporates were reduced to 300 after amalgamating companies that were more than 50 percent 
owned by another in the list. For example Genentech is 56 percent owned by Hoffman la Roche, so is 
included in the Hoffman La Roche entry; Telefonaktiebolget LM Ericsson and Ericsson Inc are combined. 
31  Because the US entry qualification to this table is holding 1000+ patents over the full 1969 to 2006 
period, some of these 300 companies actually held very few patents from applications in the 1990 to 2001 
period. For example the sole Australian company, Silverbrook Research Pty. Ltd. has only 471 patents for the 
shorter period compared to 1299 for 1969-2006. Silverbrook’s first US patent grant was filed in 1998. In 
contrast RCA, once a top 10 US patenter, has been broken up and received no patents during the 1990 to 2001 
period. The data are least reliable for the full set of 300 companies. For higher-ranking sets, such as the top 
100 or even the top 200, the listing is likely to be more reliable (subject of course to the caveats discussed in 
the Appendix).   
32  The base is actually patents where there is only a single corporate owner. There are 5,040 patents in the 
1990-2001 period that are owned by two or more companies. These data are excluded from both numerator 
and denominator in this analysis. See the Appendix for a fuller discussion.  
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Table 2 Corporately owned Australian and US patents, 1990-2001 
  AU AU US US 
 # entities # patents % of corporate # patents 
% of 
corporate 
Top 10 corporate patenters  10 13425 10% 163343 11% 
Top 50 corporate patenters 50 35685 26% 407248 28% 
Top 100 corporate patenters 100 47024 34% 513228 35% 
Top 200 corporate patenters 200 58373 43% 619371 42% 
Top 300 corporate patenters 300 61772 45% 656974 45% 
Corporates with 19+ patents 908 85157 64%   
      
Corporate grants (single ownership)   136544 100%   
Total corporate/organisational grants  141584  1468408 100% 
Total patents granted  161404  1713605  
Corporate share of grants  87.7%  84.3%  
Source: US data are calculated from http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/ oeip/taf/h_at.htm, Part B (accessed 6 
March 2008); grants to individuals are from Part A2 of the same table. Australian data are calculated from data 
supplied by IPAustralia and relate to grants by end 2007 from applications in the period 1990 to 2001. 
Notes: The data for Australia exclude patents where two or more companies share ownership. US patent count data are 
for patents granted by end 2006 from applications in the period 1990-2001 by organisations owning 1,000+ US 
patents. US data on the number of organisations are for the period 1969-2006.  
 
corporate patents. Summary data are provided in Table 2, but the visual representation of 
the very skewed distribution of patent ownership (Figure 2) tells the story more strongly. 
This graphic excludes the three companies with most patents, because extending the scale 
to include them made the long tail harder to see. The tail also extends only to the 908 
companies with 19 or more patents. If the unknown number of companies with fewer 
patents were included the skewness would increase considerably.33 
It is hard to relate this distribution of Australian patent ownership to the universe of 
innovating Australian companies because 92 percent of Australian patents are foreign-
owned. Among the top 100 Australian patenters there is only one Australian-based 
company. Data from the National Innovation Survey found 35 percent of Australian-based 
firms to be innovators (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005). Among these innovating 
firms only 4.4 percent held patents. 
 
 
                                                 
33  Figure 2 excludes 51,387 corporately owned patents at the right hand end of the scale. Assuming a 
(rather high) average of ten patents per company, this would mean over 5000 extra companies beyond the 905 
shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Ownership distribution of Australian patents, 1990-2001 
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Notes: Excludes three companies with most patents (Ericsson 1858; Hoechst (Sanofi-Aventis) 1818 and Procter & 
Gamble 1526). Also excludes all companies with less than 19 patents granted in the period. 
A major difference between the two countries is in the representation of domestic 
companies among major users of the patent system. In the USA, 43 of the top 100 patenters 
are US-based. In Australia, only one of the top 100 patenters is Australian-based.34 Thus in 
Australia, in respect of this very large share of granted patents, almost all benefits flow 
overseas: royalty payments and knowledge spillovers. These are funded by Australian 
consumers through higher prices paid for products with monopoly powers.  
The top 100 patenting companies 
The list of companies with the most patents exhibits both stability and change over time. 
Seventeen companies that were in the top 100 patenters in the USA in the 1970 to 2001 
period were no longer in that list in the period 1990 to 2001 (see Appendix, Tables A3 and 
A4).  More US-based companies left the list than joined it: thirteen compared to seven. 
Three of the new entrants are semiconductor companies, seven operate in the IT/electronics 
industries, and two in telecommunications. Only two were chemical companies. This 
contrasts with the departing companies, where eight of the 17 were in the chemical 
industries, broadly defined.  
Over 80 percent of the companies in the top 100 list held this leading position in both 
periods, and the majority of these (66) are US or Japanese. They are a diversified group in 
terms of industries, though chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electrics/electronics and 
computers/software dominate.  
                                                 
34  The assignment of country of origin to companies in the top patenters list is based on the location of 
company headquarters, not the address given by the first inventor or applicant in the patent application.  
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Because the Australian data available are only for the recent (1990-2001) period, the focus 
in the remainder of this discussion is on this more recent period.  
While there are 43 US companies among recent US top patenters,35 there are 41 East Asian 
companies, dominated by Japan, with 35 companies. Nortel Networks is Canada-based, and 
the other 15 are European, mainly German, French or Swiss. Indeed the US has more 
companies among top Australian patenters (47) than at home. There are 38 European 
companies among top patenters in Australia, dominated by companies from Germany, 
Switzerland and the UK. Only 12 Japanese companies are found among Australia’s top 100 
patenters, despite Japan ranking second in the overall share of Australian patents.  
In terms of the broad industry/technology sectors, among top US patenters electronics and 
information technology are the largest (Table 3). When semiconductors and telecoms are 
added to these two sectors, the share of patents rises to 19 percent.36 This contrasts with 
Australia where less than 7 percent of top patenters’ patents are in this broad sector. 
Another contrast is chemicals (broadly defined) and pharmaceuticals which take much the 
largest share in Australia, with 20 percent of all patents owned by the top 100 patenters. In 
the US this share is only 4 percent.  
Table 3 Distribution of top US and Australian patenters by industry sector 
 Top 100 US patenters, 1990-2001 
Top 100 Australian patenters, 1990-
2001 
Broadly defined 
industry sector 
 
Number of 
companies 
Number of 
patents 
share of 
corporate 
grants 
share 
of total 
grants 
Number of 
companies
Number 
of patents 
share of 
corporate 
grants 
share 
of total 
grants
Electronics 16 99,375 6.8% 5.8% 7 2,096 1.5% 1.3% 
IT 11 97,308 6.6% 5.7% 2 1,561 1.1% 1.0% 
Instruments 11 68,072 4.6% 4.0% 10 3,135 2.3% 1.9% 
Diversified 9 63,577 4.3% 3.7% 8 3,398 2.5% 2.1% 
Semiconductors 12 45,552 3.1% 2.7% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 
Heavy machinery 14 42,135 2.9% 2.5% 9 1,869 1.4% 1.2% 
Telecoms 6 36,954 2.5% 2.2% 7 5,378 3.9% 3.3% 
Other chemicals 12 36,077 2.5% 2.1% 29 15,527 11.4% 9.6% 
Pharmaceuticals 7 18,124 1.2% 1.1% 19 11,039 8.1% 6.8% 
Miscellaneous 2 4,107 0.3% 0.2% 9 2,872 2.1% 1.8% 
         
Top 100  100  34.8% 29.8% 100    
Total corporate grants 1,468,408    136,544   
Total grants 1,713,605    161,404   
 
If the lists of the top 100 companies owning patents in the USA and Australia are 
combined, a total of 154 companies are identified. Of these, 46 are among the top 100 
patenters in both countries. All these companies are based in the US, Japan, Korea or 
                                                 
35  If Alcatel and Lucent had not merged this would have been 44 as Lucent ranked among the top 100 US 
patenters in its own right. But the new merged company is based in France, so no longer shows up as a US 
company.  
36  Or to 21 percent if autos are added. Autos have been classified here to heavy industry, but a large share 
of innovation in the automobile industry is electronic. 
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Europe. Nearly half (18) are chemical (including oil but not oil services) or pharmaceutical 
companies, and a further 16 operate in the information technology/electronics/telecoms 
sectors. Many of these companies are household names (Table 4). This group of 46 
companies owns 60 percent of the Australian patents owned by the top 100 Australian 
patenters, and 51 percent of patents held by the top 100 US patenters. A further perspective 
is that these 46 companies between them own 18 percent of all Australian patents and 16 
percent of all US patents (from applications in the years 1990-2001). 
These companies are clearly quite selective in what they patent in Australia compared to 
the USA. But where a company patents in both countries, the number of patents taken out 
in Australia is usually much less. Within the chemical and pharmaceutical industries the 
ratio various from 69 percent (Hoechst)37 to 14 percent (Sumitomo Chemicals) around an 
average of 28 percent. On average the number of Australian patents acquired is less than 6 
percent of those acquired in the US in electronics, information technology and telecoms. 
However the two mobile telecoms companies in the list (Ericsson and Nokia) both acquire 
about a third as many patents in Australia as in the US. Another company that has a high 
Australian patenting ratio is Kimberley-Clark (37 percent). Possible explanations are that 
only genuinely significant inventions are patented on a global basis, or that where Australia 
lacks industrial depth it is seen as unnecessary to take out patents.  
There are 56 companies in the top Australian patenters list which are not among the top 100 
US patenters (though 36 are found among the 300 companies in the US frequent patenters 
table). Details are shown in the Appendix in Table A5. Similarly there are 56 companies in 
the top 100 US patenters list which are not among the top 100 Australian patenters. Only 
nine of these are among the top 300 Australian patenters, though another 16 have at least 19 
Australian patents (that is, are among Australia’s top 900 patenters). Details are shown in 
the Appendix in Table A6. 
There are quite distinct patterns in the industries/technologies represented in these two lists. 
Where a particular industry is totally absent in Australia—such as semiconductors—top US 
patenters simply do not patent at all in Australia. Only two of the twelve semi-conductor 
companies patent in Australia, and both operate across a wider range of technologies 
(Sanyo Electric and Texas Instruments). In contrast the companies which are among the top 
100 patenters in Australia but not in the USA are dominated by chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies.  
There are also quite distinct differences between these two lists in where the companies are 
headquartered. Among the 56 top US patenters, 30 are based in Japan, Korea or Taiwan, 
and 22 in the US or Canada. Only two are based in Europe. In contrast among these 
Australian top patenters, 23 are based in Europe and 27 in Japan. 
As noted earlier there is only one Australian company among the top 100 Australian 
patenters. Silverbrook Research operates in the high-speed printing business, and its 
technology involves a high-speed printer, a scanning device, coded forms and invisible ink 
                                                 
37  This high percentage may be due to undercounting of Hoechst patents in the USPTO major patenters 
table. That table shows a 45 percent undercount for Hoechst for the 1969 to 2006 period compared to a basic 
USPTO search for the Hoechst constituent companies. If the 1990-2001 data are inflated by 45 percent then 
the ratio of Australian to US patents falls to 48 percent, which is still well above the sector average.  
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Table 4 Companies both in top 100 US and top 100 Australian patenters 
Company name HQ US 
rank
AU 
rank 
main field of activity # AU grants from filings in: # US grants from filings in:
Chemical, pharmaceutical and related  
1990- 
1995 
1996-
2001 
1990-
2001 
1990- 
1995 
1996-
2001 
1990-
2001 
Sanofi / Aventis [Hoechst] FR 55 2 pharma 1,058 760 1,818 2,144 490 2,634 
Procter & Gamble US 32 3 mixed chemical 665 861 1,526 1,705 3,268 4,973 
Exxon-Mobil US 41 7 chemical / oil 553 608 1,161 2,863 1,019 3,882 
Du Pont US 26 11 
chemicals / plastic, 
rubber 520 458 978 3,170 2,832 6,002 
Bayer AG DE 36 12 pharma 341 608 949 2,396 2,207 4,603 
Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) US 76 13 pharma 332 559 891 1,051 1,081 2,132 
BASF AG DE 28 14 
chemicals / 
synthetics 395 495 890 2,585 3,288 5,873 
Pfizer US 57 16 pharma 382 501 883 1,117 1,391 2,508 
Shell Oil Company NL/UK 75 17 chemical / oil 424 412 836 1,274 859 2,133 
Dow Chemicals  US 66 19 mixed chemical 509 287 796 1,596 764 2,360 
Novartis AG CH 71 21 pharma 475 276 751 2,178 70 2,248 
Hoffmann La Roche CH 85 23 mixed chemical 260 427 687 972 894 1,866 
Wyeth  US 70 28 pharma 305 242 547 1,660 622 2,282 
Eli Lilly US 93 32 mixed chemical 241 218 459 930 782 1,712 
Abbott Laboratories US 92 35 pharma 194 222 416 936 781 1,717 
L'Oreal FR 77 46 cosmetics 110 224 334 651 1,478 2,129 
Corning Incorporated US 98 52 
glass, ceramics, fibre 
optics 139 175 314 566 1,067 1,633 
Sumitomo Chemicals JP 84 58 chemicals 133 135 268 909 973 1,882 
           
Sector sub-total     7,036 7,468 14,504 28,703 23,866 52,569 
% of top 100 Australian or top 100 US companies’ patents 14.6% 15.5% 30.1% 5.2% 4.4% 9.6% 
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Table 4 Companies in top 100 US and top 100 Australian patenters (continued) 
Company name HQ US rank AU rank main field of activity # AU grants from filings in: # US grants from filings in:
Electronics, computing, telecommunications and related 
1990- 
1995 
1996-
2001 
1990-
2001 
1990- 
1995 
1996-
2001 
1990-
2001 
Ericsson SE 30 1 telecoms 475 1,383 1,858 767 4,879 5,646
NEC  JP 3 5 IT 586 719 1,305 5,319 11,463 16,782
Alcatel-Lucent FR (US) 17 8 telecoms 668 454 1,122 1,380 8,036 9,416
Nokia  FI 60 18 telecoms 315 494 809 265 2,199 2,464
Sony  JP 5 25 electronics / IT 276 312 588 4,530 9,636 14,166
Motorola  US 10 29 telecoms 308 182 490 5,887 6,069 11,956
Samsung Electronics KR 11 30 diversified 31 439 470 2,590 9,249 11,839
Panasonic  JP 4 45 electrics, 
semiconductors 
114 221 335 5,105 9,701 14,806
Sumitomo Electric  JP 69 47 electronics 193 138 331 1,339 965 2,304
AT&T US 34 57 telecoms 231 42 273 2,891 1,871 4,762
Mitsubishi Denki JP 8 61 electronics 131 131 262 6,055 7,058 13,113
Fujitsu Limited JP 9 64 computers 179 77 256 4,516 8,174 12,690
General Electric  US 12 67 diversified 127 105 232 5,333 6,259 11,592
Philips Electronics NL 15 70 electronics, lighting 130 100 230 3,505 6,418 9,923
Hitachi JP 6 93 diversified 76 105 181 5,984 8,051 14,035
LG Electronics KR 68 94 electronics, healthcare 19 160 179 168 2,142 2,310
      
Sector sub-total     3,859 5,062 8,921 55,634 102,170 157,804
% of top 100 Australian or top 100 US companies’ patents 8.0% 10.5% 18.5% 10.2% 18.7% 28.8% 
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Table 4 Companies in top 100 US and top 100 Australian patenters (continued) 
Company name HQ US 
rank
AU 
rank 
main field of activity # AU grants from filings in: # US grants from filings in:
Instruments; light machinery 
1990- 
1995 
1996-
2001 
1990-
2001 
1990- 
1995 
1996-
2001 
1990-
2001 
Canon. JP 2 10 cameras, copiers, printers 330 686 1,016 9,101 11,774 20,875 
Medtronic  US 81 81 medical devices 126 78 204 530 1,402 1,932 
Eastman Kodak US 13 84 photographic & optical 125 69 194 5,200 5,725 10,925 
Sector sub-total     581 833 1,414 14,831 18,901 33,732 
% of top 100 Australian or top 100 US companies’ patents 1.2% 1.7% 2.9% 2.7% 3.5% 6.3% 
Diversified, and engineering        
3M US 24 6 mixed 673 613 1,286 3,196 3,304 6,500 
Siemens DE 22 33 diversified 168 283 451 2,630 5,016 7,646 
Robert Bosch  DE 29 56 automotive products, appliances 70 225 295 1,944 3,802 5,746 
Eaton  US 79 62 diversified (components) 151 109 260 938 1,049 1,987 
Honeywell  US 27 87 diversified (defence/aerospace) 64 126 190 2,918 2,983 5,901 
Caterpillar US 59 89 heavy equipment 80 106 186 856 1,615 2,471 
Hughes Aircraft  US 83 96 defence/aerospace 161 17 178 1,834 51 1,885 
Sector sub-total     1367 1479 2,846 14,316 17,820 32,136 
% of top 100 Australian or top 100 US companies’ patents 2.8% 3.1% 5.9% 2.6% 3.3% 5.9% 
Other   
Kimberly-Clark  US 65 15 paper 331 553 884 650 1,714 2,364 
Halliburton  US 90 85 oil services 83 110 193 698 1,045 1,743 
Sector sub-total     414 663 1,077 1,348 2,759 4,107 
% of top 100 Australian or top 100 US companies’ patents 0.9% 1.4% 2.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.8% 
Total number of patents in group of 46 13,257 15,505 28,762 114,832 165,516 280,348
Total number of patents held by top 100 companies in Australia or the USA 21,100 25,775 46,875 188,916 324,312 513,228
Share of group of 46 in top 100 Australian or top 100 US patenting companies 28% 32% 60% 21% 30% 51% 
Note: Country codes are shown at the end of the Appendix. 
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(Moir forthcoming: Appendix 6). This is an industry rife with patent thickets. Silverbrook’s 
website notes with pride the number of patents it is acquiring. Many are clearly designed to 
hide the underlying technology, with titles such as “network refrigerator and printer” (a 
combined fridge and printer), “method for searching information using coded data” (a 
rather cumbersome web searching method) and “method and system for route planning” 
(prints a map with coded data, then a scanner and computer are needed to determine the 
route).  
A very large proportion of patents granted in both countries are acquired by a very small 
number of companies. Ownership of such large numbers of patents does not guarantee that 
any of these patents fall in the very small set of high-value patents. But it does suggest that 
their owners see an important value in patenting. The chemical industries, as noted above, 
involve highly codified technologies and have always been seen as particularly suited to the 
patent intervention, given the high costs of Phase III trials. The electronics and 
semiconductor industries are well-known for requiring large volumes of patents which are 
cross-traded to acquire access to the patented technology owned by other parties.  
But the interesting question from a political economy perspective is what role these major 
patenters play in the development of patent policy.  
Thirteen US companies played a major role in the development of the TRIPS agenda 
(Drahos 2002: 118). Two of these companies—Rockwell International and FMC—were 
among the top 100 US patenters in the period 1970-2001,38 and ten were major patenters in 
the 1990-2001 period.39 Four of these latter ten are among the 46 companies which patent 
heavily in both the USA and Australia: Merck Sharp & Dohme, Pfizer, Du Pont and 
General Electric. Another three—IBM, Hewlett-Packard and General Motors—are among 
the top 100 patenters in the USA, and are frequent patenters in Australia, but not among the 
top 100. The final three—Bristol-Myers Squibb, Monsanto and Johnson & Johnson—are 
among the top 100 patenters in Australia, but not among the top US 100.  
It is noticeable that seven of these 12 companies are from the pharmaceutical/chemicals 
sector, where knowledge is more highly codified. Two other companies are from the 
information technology sector, one of which, IBM, is very well known for its enormous 
patent portfolio. As at the end of December 2006 it had been granted 49,171 US patents. 
During the period from 1969 to 2001 IBM has been consistently among the ten most 
prolific patenters in the USA. General Electric is the next most prolific US patenter, having 
been among the top ten US patenters for 26 of these 33 years. It ranked top from 1969 until 
1985 (Table 5). The marginally shifting pattern among the top ten US patenters illustrates a 
number of points. Despite a number of new entrants to this exclusive group, there are only 
33 companies that have ever been in the top ten group in this 33-year period, and six of 
                                                 
38  Since 1979 Rockwell International began to spin-off its various business segments, and finally separated 
into Rockwell Collins and Rockwell Automation in 2001 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockwell_ 
International and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockwell_Automation, accessed 25 August 2008). FMC ranked 
91st among US patenters in the period 1970 to 2001, but was only 182nd in the 1990 to 2001 period. 
39  The thirteenth company closely involved in TRIPS was Warner Communications. During the lead-up to 
the TRIPS negotiations Warner Communications is likely to have had a greater interest in copyright than 
patents. In the early 1980s, when the Uruguay round of negotiations commenced, software was generally seen 
as unpatentable. Indeed copyright protection for software was written into the TRIPS Agreement (Article 10). 
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these have only been in the group for three years or less. So, in general, 25 companies 
dominate US patenting. But the most striking thing about the top ten patenters is the shift to 
a predominance by Japanese and Korean companies.  
The story of the US-Japan patent wars has been told elsewhere (Warshofsky 1994). 
Another story that has been told elsewhere is the rising concern in the USA during the 
1970s and 1980s about declining productivity (Scherer 2006). It was against this 
background that the argument to extend the reach of US patent legislation, initially through 
Special 301, and subsequently through the GATT framework, gained ground. It is therefore 
particularly ironic, that as US patent laws have broadened their reach, in response to US 
corporate lobbying, the major companies now taking advantage of these government-
backed monopolies in the USA are foreign companies. 
In 1969 the top ten patenters in the USA were all US companies. This number gradually 
dropped during the 1970s falling to three out of ten in the late 1980s. By 1995, the year 
TRIPS became mandatory as a qualification for membership of the WTO, only two out of 
the top ten US patenters were US companies. These outcomes would not actually have been 
known until the early 2000s, because of long processing delays. There has been some 
recovery since then, with Hewlett-Packard, Intel and Micron Technologies entering, but 
foreign companies still dominate the top ten US patenter ranks. There appears to be very 
little comment about this in the various debates about the US patent system. 
Next steps: priorities for further research 
In each of Australia and the USA a mere 100 companies own over a third of patents granted 
to organisations. This distribution has a very long tail, with very many companies owning 
just a few patents. Data from national innovation surveys show that the proportion of firms 
holding any patents is a tiny fraction of innovating firms. Frequent patenters may not 
receive the greatest gross private value from their patents, because of the very skewed 
distribution of patent values. But it is likely they receive substantial value from their patents 
or patent volumes would be lower. Their very high patent volumes increase costs for other 
innovators. Bessen and Meurer (2008) have pointed out how the costs of establishing the 
boundaries of patented technology increase with the volume of patents. 
Despite the lack of empirical evidence that patents are needed to induce innovation, there is 
strong political support for stronger and broader patents. The most parsimonious 
explanation of this conundrum is the rent-seeking activities of a small number of major 
beneficiaries. Quite recently this aspect of patent policy has been noted (Landes and Posner 
2004; Scherer 2006; Bessen and Meurer 2008). Because data on frequent patenters are not 
readily available, the specific companies concerned are rarely named. The exception is a 
small number of studies investigating the new subject matter area of business methods 
(Lerner 2002; Hall 2003; Wagner 2008).40  
                                                 
40  Each of these studies finds quite concentrated patent ownership. For US business method patents granted 
to 2000, Hall found that 36 percent were held by just 44 companies. Lerner found that 25 percent of US 
finance patents were held by 19 companies. Wagner found that over 40 percent of business method 
applications at the EPO (where patents had already been granted in the USA) were held by just 14 firms. 
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Table 5 Top ten patenters in USA: 1969 to 2001 
 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
GEC GEC GEC GEC GEC 
Honeywell Honeywell Honeywell Honeywell Westinghouse
AT&T AT&T AT&T General Motors Honeywell 
Dow Chemical General Motors  # General Motors IBM Dow Chemical
IBM Dow Chemical Dow Chemical Dow Chemical General Motors
Du Pont IBM Westinghouse AT&T Du Pont 
Westinghouse Westinghouse IBM Westinghouse IBM 
Wyeth Eastman Kodak Du Pont Du Pont Novartis 
Eastman Kodak Du Pont Eastman Kodak Novartis Xerox # 
ConocoPhillips Novartis # Novartis Eastman Kodak Siemens # 
US: 10 US: 9 US:  9 US:  9 US:  7 
 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
GEC GEC GEC GEC GEC 
Honeywell Honeywell Honeywell Honeywell Honeywell 
Westinghouse Novartis Dow Chemical Dow Chemical Dow Chemical
Dow Chemical IBM Westinghouse Wyeth Exxon-Mobil 
Xerox Westinghouse IBM IBM Novartis 
Bayer # Philips Novartis RCA Hitachi  
Novartis Xerox Hitachi # Exxon-Mobil# Westinghouse
Siemens Bayer AT&T Bayer Bayer 
Philips # Dow Chemical RCA # Westinghouse AT&T 
AT&T Wyeth Bayer Siemens IBM 
US:  5 US:  6 US:  7 US:  8 US:  7 
 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
GEC GEC GEC GEC GEC 
IBM Honeywell IBM Hitachi Toshiba 
Honeywell Hitachi Honeywell Toshiba Hitachi 
Hitachi IBM Hitachi Exxon-Mobil IBM 
RCA Dow Chemical RCA Honeywell Exxon-Mobil 
Bayer RCA AT&T IBM Dow Chemical
Siemens Philips Exxon-Mobil AT&T Honeywell 
AT&T Exxon-Mobil Dow Chemical Dow Chemical AT&T 
Dow Chemical AT&T Toshiba # Philips Philips 
Exxon-Mobil Siemens Siemens Canon # RCA 
US:  7 US:  7 US:  7 US:  6 US:  7 
 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
GEC Hitachi Hitachi Hitachi Hitachi 
Hitachi GEC Canon Toshiba Toshiba 
Toshiba Dow Chemical Toshiba Fuji Photo Mitsubishi Denki
Exxon-Mobil Toshiba GEC Canon Canon 
Canon Canon Philips GEC Fuji Photo 
Dow Chemical Philips Dow Chemical Philips GEC 
Honeywell Fuji Photo Fuji Photo Mitsubishi 
Denki#
Philips 
Philips Exxon-Mobil IBM IBM Eastman Kodak
IBM IBM Siemens Siemens IBM 
Fuji Photo # Honeywell Mitsubishi Exxon-Mobil Honeywell 
US:  5 US:  5 US:  3 US:  3 US:  4 
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Table 5 Top ten patenters in USA: 1969 to 2001  (continued) 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Hitachi Toshiba IBM IBM Canon 
Toshiba Hitachi Toshiba Canon IBM 
Canon Canon Canon Eastman Kodak Motorola 
Mitsubishi 
Denki 
Mitsubishi Denki Mitsubishi 
Denki
Mitsubishi Denki Mitsubishi Denki
Eastman Kodak Eastman Kodak Hitachi GEC Hitachi 
GEC GEC Eastman Kodak Toshiba Panasonic 
Philips IBM GEC Hitachi Toshiba 
Fuji Photo Motorola # Panasonic # NEC # GEC 
IBM Fuji Photo Motorola Motorola Eastman Kodak
Du Pont Du Pont Fuji Photo Panasonic NEC 
US:  4 US:  5 US:  4 US:  4 US:  4 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Canon IBM IBM IBM IBM 
IBM Canon Canon Canon NEC 
NEC Motorola NEC NEC Lucent* 
Motorola NEC Samsung# Sony Samsung 
Toshiba Fujitsu Sony Samsung Canon 
Fujitsu # Sony Motorola Fujitsu Sony 
Hitachi Hitachi Fujitsu Motorola Micron 
Mitsubishi 
Denki 
Mitsubishi Denki Toshiba Lucent* # Fujitsu 
Panasonic Toshiba Eastman Kodak Panasonic Panasonic 
Sony # Panasonic Panasonic Toshiba Toshiba 
US:  2 US:  2 US:  3 US:  3 US:  3 
 
1999 2000 2001
IBM IBM IBM
NEC Panasonic Hewlett-Packard
Canon Micron Technology Panasonic
Lucent* NEC Hitachi
Sony Canon Canon
Panasonic Hitachi Micron Technology
Micron Technology# Hewlett-Packard# Philips
Samsung Intel Intel
Intel # Sony Sony
Hitachi GEC Samsung
US:  4 US:  5 US:  4
Notes: Companies shown in bold are headquartered outside the USA. 
 # first entry into top 10 in period 1971-2001 
• Lucent is now merged with Alcatel, but achieved top 10 entry on its own account so is counted 
here as a US company 
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Organisations representing large global companies have suggested it is inappropriate for 
non-profit non-government organisations to participate in global policy negotiations. 
However it has been the practice for some decades for profit-making non-government 
organisations (companies) to have an inside seat at the negotiating table. This has 
particularly been the case in negotiations on “intellectual property” policy. Indeed, the 
agenda to include intellectual property in trade negotiations was driven by the interests of a 
small number of very large companies (Drahos 2002; Sell 2003).  
Given this, it seems at first sight surprising that there is so little analysis of the very skewed 
ownership of patents. It is also surprising that the patent case is not frequently used as an 
example in case studies of rent-seeking and regulatory capture. There are some real 
research opportunities here. A major reason for the dearth of empirical studies is, however, 
the difficulty in obtaining data that can be analysed from this perspective. Where such data 
are obtained they require long and tedious cleaning before they can be used.  
The data presented here are a small first step in addressing this gap. The source data for the 
US is not the preferred source, but is the sole reasonably available public source. Both data 
series used here also suffer from gaps in identifying wholly or majority owned subsidiaries. 
Nor has it been possible to extend the analysis to Europe and Japan. Given the global reach 
of the patent system, a global analysis would be appropriate. Another interesting area for 
research would be how the ownership structure and distribution has changed for those 
countries forced to radically change their patent legislation or introduce patent systems as 
part of their WTO membership.  
Bessen and Meurer point to the continued use of anecdote and rhetoric in patent policy 
discussions (Bessen and Meurer 2008: 3). There is some evidence that the lack of more 
systematic data is due to intervention by interested parties. In relation to the extension of 
patents to software and business methods, Kahin notes that a White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy study into the quality of such patents was suspended due to 
the intervention of an (unnamed) large global company (Kahin 2003). He also notes the 
role of the patent bar in overturning a proposed US General Accounting Office study of 
business method patents.41 Bessen and Meurer comment that the Federal Trade 
Commission (US FTC 2003) recommendation which was most prominently rejected by the 
Intellectual Property Owners Association was Recommendation 10 ‘expand consideration 
of economic learning and competition policy concerns in patent law decisionmaking’ 
(Bessen and Meurer, 2008: 293-4). Calls for a European Patent Observatory have received 
no response (Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002). 
The data placed on the table here will hopefully encourage innovation and competition 
policy makers to ask more demanding questions in regard to the impact of the patent 
system, and to insist on evidence-based answers to these questions.  
                                                 
41  This proposed study was in the penultimate Senate draft of the American Inventors Protection Act of 
1999 (Kahin, 2003).  
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Appendix Data on patent ownership 
This appendix looks briefly at two important economic considerations in analysing patent 
data:  application versus grant data and grant data by grant year or application year. It also 
provides information on the data sources used in this paper and draws attention to some of 
their quirks and limitations. 
Application or grant data? 
From an economic perspective patent grants are of substantially more interest than patent 
applications. The main economic impact of an as-yet-ungranted application is to add to the 
cost of patent search.42 But if an application is never granted it cannot deliver benefits nor 
interfere with subsequent innovation. This important economic distinction becomes less 
critical in practice where patent grant rates are very high. In the USA it has been suggested 
that some 95 percent of applications are granted (Quillen Jr. and Webster 2001). Grant rates 
were 93 percent in France, 83 percent in the UK and 35 percent in Germany for the period 
1950 to 1979 (Schankerman and Pakes 1986: Table 1). For Australia grant rates in the years 
1995 to 1998 varied from 88 to 94 percent (Table A2).  
Despite the very high proportions of applications granted in some countries, some 
applications do not proceed to grant, often because they are withdrawn by the applicant.43  
Grants by application year or grant year? 
Much analysis of patent data is based on patent applications, largely because such data are 
far more readily available than data on patent grants. While aggregate grant data by grant 
year are often available, grant year data are subject to substantial impact by changing 
resourcing in patent offices (Griliches 1990: 1690-1693). Where grant rates are very high, 
application data are probably more reliable than grant year data. Withdrawn applications 
are likely to be relatively marginal in terms of their economic impact, and this error is 
probably less than the errors introduced by changing patent examination resources.44  
This paper uses only data on granted patents. These data are presented by year of 
application, as it is then that the underlying business decision is made. As a consequence 
the data are not very recent – it can take as much as seven years for the bulk of a filing 
cohort to progress through a patent office.  
                                                 
42  In theory, businesses monitor patent applications to make sure they do not trespass on competitors’ 
territory. In practice, most businesses do not do this, partly because of the distraction from their business, and 
partly because the cost is too high (see Bessen and Meurer 2008: 55). In some countries, e.g. the USA, 
infringement damages rules create an incentive not to know. 
43  Little seems to be written on the topic of applications which do not proceed to grant. For business 
method patents in Australia, withdrawal rates were in the range 33 to 43 percent (1998 to 2000), even after 
non-entry PCT cases were excluded from the applications data (Moir forthcoming: Table 4.1).  
44  Though where the subject of interest is ownership, there is a large unknown in terms of differential 
success rates for firms patenting frequently compared to infrequent patenters. Where a frequent patenter is 
developing a thicket, there may be a greater probability of allowing some patents to lapse in the face of 
examiner opposition.  
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A general caveat 
A general caveat about the data used in this paper is that no account is taken of non-
renewal. Whether patents are differentially renewed by frequent or less frequent patenters is 
certainly an issue of interest, but lies well beyond the scope of this study. Specific caveats 
about the US and Australia sources are discussed below. 
US data 
The US data used in this paper are from the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark 
Office) web site. All grants data are grants by application (filing) year and are from the 
historical statistics on "utility" patents,45 specifically the table "Historic Data, All 
Technologies (Utility Patents) Report".46 Applications data (used in Figure 1) are from the 
“U.S. Patent Statistics Report” at the same site.47  
Part A2 of this table shows the number of patents granted since 1963, distributed by the 
date of grant and the date of the patent application. It provides data by origin, using the 
residence of the first-named inventor to determine origin. It also separates data by broad 
categories of ownership, e.g., corporate-owned, government-owned, or individual-owned. 
These Part A2 data are used for Table 1, and for all data on total grants or grants to 
individuals. The data in this table refer to grants made between 1 January 1963 and 31 
December 2006.  
One unexplained aspect of the Part A2 tables is that the number of grants shown for filing 
year 1963 (243,178) is substantially greater than the number of grants shown for each of the 
following years (32,206; 54,917; 59,716; 60,077; 63,010). As the data are grants by file 
year, this suggests that the 1963 data may contain data from earlier file years.48 For this 
reason data from the initial year are avoided in comparing changes over time.  
Given the basis for determining origin, it is also important to be wary of drawing fine 
distinctions. Firstly, the classification is based on data at the time of the patent grant. 
Secondly, residence of first-named inventor could be different from residence of the owner. 
This is likely to introduce a small degree of error into the data. However, there is no 
evidence that inventor residence is substantially different from ownership residence. There 
will be differences at the margin, but in terms of providing an overall picture, the data 
should be reasonably reliable. 
Part B of this set of tables provides data on the national and international corporations, 
government agencies and other organisations that have received 1,000 or more patents 
since 1969. Data are provided annually from 1969 to 2006, both by year of grant and by 
year of application. Again, however the data for the first year give rise to some concerns. In 
                                                 
45  The US categorises a number of legislative monopolies as "patents". Those called "utility patents" are for 
inventions, and are comparable with patents granted in other countries. All US data in this paper are for utility 
patents only.  
46  http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/ taf/h_at.htm (accessed 4 March 2008).  
47  The best entry point for this series of tables is is http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/ 
oeip/taf/tafp.html, then choose “Patent Statistics Reports Available For Viewing”. If that does not work search 
the USPTO site for “Calendar Year Patent Statistics”. 
48  I have attempted to obtain the USPTO’s views on this, but they have deleted my emails without reading 
them. 
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terms of the data by year of grant, the data for 1969 are sufficiently similar to data for 
subsequent years for them to appear robust. However this is not the case for the grant data 
by year of application, the data used in this paper. 
Part B grant by year of application data for 1969 are systematically substantially greater 
than data for subsequent years by a factor of about four. As was the case with Part A2 data 
for 1963, this suggests that the 1969 data include grants from earlier file years. This could 
arise if the database is initially set up by year of grant. The earliest year will therefore 
include grants to patents filed over the previous six or seven years. If data for these earlier 
application years are not eliminated the data for the first year shown (either 1963 or 1969) 
will be inaccurate.  
Another problem with these data on grants by application year is that recent years are likely 
to be substantially incomplete. The USPTO warns: 
"Since the average time period between filing for a patent and the issuing of 
the patent (i.e., the patent's "pendency") is now about 24 months [sic] (for 
utility patents), the patent grant data, as distributed by year of application, are 
incomplete for the most recent years that are displayed in the report. This is 
because a significant number of those applications which ultimately will 
become patents were still pending …"   
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_at.htm)  
The note goes on to give figures for the completeness of data for cohorts of patent 
applications: 94% complete for 2000 applications, 86% complete for 2001 applications, 
76% complete for 2002 applications, 54% complete for 2003 applications, and 27% 
complete for 2004 applications. Clearly data from 2003 and later application cohorts could 
be quite unrepresentative of the final complete cohort. In this paper an arbitrary decision 
has been made to include data up to and including 2001 in time trend estimates, despite the 
fact that the last two years of this period are 14% and 6% incomplete.  
A final practical difficulty with these data is that the Part B data are for organisations, and 
no entry is provided for the total of all granted patents. Clearly data for individuals would 
not be included with organisations, but adding data for individuals from Part A2 to data for 
organisations from Part B does not give the totals for all granted patents shown in Part A2. 
The data are identical for the four years 2002-2006, and are reasonably close for individual 
years from 1970 to 2006 (the error ranging from -18 to 166). But for the year 1969, the 
difference is 131,733 (twice the reported number of grants (65,891) for that application 
year. Again this suggests that the start year contains data from applications filed over a 
number of years, not just in 1969. It also clearly suggests that it would be more accurate to 
base data for, and analyses of, the top patenting organisations on the period from 1970.  
But the major disadvantage of this data source is that if a company patents through 
subsidiaries, and none of these individually own 1000+ patents, the company is not 
included in the table. Several large chemical, pharmaceutical and related companies are 
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identified as major patenters in Australia but do not show up in the top US patenters list.49 
Where companies are included their total patent count may be underestimated if major 
patenting subsidiaries do not reach the 1000 threshold.50  
Australian data 
The Australian data used in this paper refer only to standard patents.51 IPAustralia provided 
excel spreadsheets for all granted standard patents filed from 1990 onwards, and granted by 
the end of December 2007. 
A number of fields were included: application number, PCT number, year filed, year 
entered national phase, year granted, application status, death date, year of death, revoked 
date, patent life (years), invention title, IPC class (to sub-group level), owner name, type of 
owner (organisation / individual) and country name. Because of missing country codes, 
fields for address were added. The data were provided in separate annual files, based on the 
date of entry to national phase. For PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) applications this 
means that some data were provided in respect of patents filed before 1990.52  
Initial inspection of the data showed that there were a number of duplicate entries. For the 
national phase entry years to 2001 these occurred wherever there were multiple owners of 
the patent, and duplicates ran consistently at 7 percent for each year. From 2002 duplicates 
occurred not just for multiple owners, but also for multiple IPC classifications.53 The 
proportion of duplicate entries increased to 24 percent in 2002 and was over 40 percent for 
2003 and 2004. The first step in preparing the data was thus to retain the data on multiple 
owners, while removing duplicate entries.  
Pendency times 
Once duplicate entries were removed, the data were set up by year of filing. Because of the 
way patent administration currently operates, several years can elapse between filing and 
                                                 
49  For example, Unilever is not in the list, but a name search identified 1156 patents granted to Unilever 
companies for applications from 1969 to 2006. Rhodia is not listed under any name, but a search for Rhone 
and Poulenc identified 3185 patents granted during the period.  
50  For example, Johnson & Johnson is among the top ten Australian patenters but only 249th in the USA, 
where it is listed as its subsidiary Ethicon, with a patent total of 1194 for the 1969 to 2006 period. A search 
for patents granted to any Johnson & Johnson company identified a total of 3954 patents for the whole period, 
increasing the US rank to 81st. 
51  Australia has a two-tier patent system. Standard patents are comparable to patents issued in most WTO 
member countries. They have a 20-year term, and require that the grant be for an invention which is novel, 
inventive and has utility in a field of economic activity. Australia also issues innovation patents, which have a 
shorter term, and a reduced inventiveness test. They can be granted without examination, but cannot be used 
to prevent others' activity until they have been examined.  
52  The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) process allows an applicant to reserve the option of filing the same 
application in a range of countries, using the priority date of the first filing. Following filing in a single 
country, the applicant has up to 12 months to decide to file the application through the PCT route. The 
applicant then has a further 16 months to obtain an International Search Report (ISR). 'National phase' entry 
can occur up to 30 months after first filing, depending on circumstances. See http://www.wipo.int/ 
pct/en/seminar/basic_1/timeline.pdf for a useful diagrammatic illustration of these timelines (last accessed 14 
August 2007). There are no real limits on how long an application can stay in the system, as examiner and 
applicant exchange views about the merit of the 'invention', though renewal fees will be payable. 
53  The IPC (International Patent Classification) is used by examiners to search for similar "inventions". 
Patents can be classified to many different sub-groups.  
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grant.54 This is in marked contrast to earlier periods, where patents had to be examined 
within a fixed time period (see Second Reading Speech, 22 May 1952, Senate Hansard: 
687). From 1990 to 1997 patent cohorts were largely completed within a period of four 
years from year of filing. However it is evident from the data in Tables A1 and A2 that the 
time taken to examine a cohort of patents has increased substantially.  
The pace at which a patent application proceeds through the system is largely driven by 
three factors: the wishes of the applicant, the volume of examination resources and the 
extent of any problems raised by the examiner. At each stage in the process the applicant 
has a period of time in which to respond, or request movement to the next stage. Some 
applicants want speedy processing, ask for expedited examination, and reply quickly to 
examiner's reports. Other applicants want the grant of the patent to be delayed, and take the 
longest possible time to respond to Patent Office timelines, such as direction to request an 
examination, or adverse examiner's reports. Indeed applicants often miss deadlines, and 
request extensions (after the fact), which are usually granted. The more marginal an 
"invention" the more likely an examiner is to raise objections. If the applicant's response to 
the initial objections is limited, the examiner may maintain her/his objections, and a further 
round of correspondence can occur. Since the introduction of the Patents Act 1952 there 
has been no limit to the time an application can remain in examination, except for the 20-
year limit from date of filing.  
There are thus likely to be differences between patents which have moved quickly through 
the system, those that take an average time, and those that take a very long time. In 
analysing any set of patents it is therefore preferable to deal with completed filing cohorts, 
to avoid the unknown biases resulting from these factors. Due to the extended time now 
necessary for completion of a filing cohort, this means that patent grant data are not at all 
timely. 
Table A1 shows the progress of filing cohorts through the Australian Patent Office. Row 
totals show the number of patents granted from filings in a particular year. Patents filed in 
1997 were processed very speedily. But since 1998 the proportion of grants issued within 
two years of filing has dropped dramatically, offset by a big increase in the proportion of 
patents issuing five years after filing. For the 2001 cohort there is evidence of an increased 
proportion of grants not issuing until six years after filing. It now appears to take six to 
seven years for a cohort of patent applications to move substantially through the Australian 
patent administration system. The data are presented in Table A2 in terms of the proportion 
of grants made in a particular year after filing, and this table shows clearly the reduced 
percentage processed within two years, and the increased percentage taking six years or 
more to process.  
Grant rates 
Table A2 also shows, in the penultimate column, the proportion of applications granted a 
patent by the end of 2007. As data on applications are not readily available for earlier years, 
                                                 
54  One patent granted in Australia in 2007 was filed in 1992 – a pendency period of 15 years! At the time 
application 199225503 (“Gaseous ultrasound contrast media and method for selecting gases for use as 
ultrasound contrast media”) was filed by GE Healthcare AS, the maximum patent duration was 16 years. This 
was, of course later extended to 20 years to comply with the TRIPS Treaty.  
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these data are presented only for the period from 1995. Processing appears to be complete 
for the application years 1995 to 1998, and the data show that very high percentages of 
applications are granted patents: between 88 and 94 percent. As some patent applications 
are allowed to lapse by their owners, these data suggest that the Australian Patent Office is 
rarely successful in opposing grant of a patent, once an application is filed. It could almost 
be suggested that the very act of filing a patent application is sufficient to achieve grant of a 
patent, despite the theoretical patentability criteria that need to be met.  
Ownership information 
The ownership details in the dataset required considerable cleaning. Because of the focus 
on corporate ownership, the first step was to separate out individual owners (7.9 percent) 
and governments or non-profit research owners (4.4 percent). All patents owned 
exclusively by one or more individuals or only by governments or non-profit research 
owners are excluded from the analysis in this paper. The remaining 141,584 patents include 
at least one corporate owner and might also include individual owners and non-profit 
organisations (including government agencies).  
Where multiple ownership involves a company and individuals,55 a company and a non-
profit organisation, or two branches of the same company, the patent is retained in the 
dataset. Patents owned by multiple companies (and any other entities) are not included in 
this analysis (this involves 5,214 patents or 3.7 percent of corporate grants in 1990-2001). 
The final dataset of 136,399 corporately owned patents included in this analysis thus covers 
84.5 percent of granted patents, 91.8 percent of patents granted to organisations, or 96.3 
percent of patents with at least one corporate owner.  
Period covered 
As discussed above, patent application cohorts for recent years are substantially incomplete 
as most patent systems allow a very long period for processing. In order to avoid the biases 
of including incomplete years, the data used in this paper were restricted to the application 
cohorts from 1990 to 2001. The analysis in this paper is based on this 12-year period.  
The initial intent was to include in the analysis a review of changes in frequent patenting 
during the period, so the data were split into two sets: the period 1990-1995 and the period 
1996-2001. Within each of these 6-year periods companies were sorted by name, then 
grouped into counts for the same company. This proved to be an extremely tedious and 
time-consuming business. This was due to the impact of both small typographical 
differences in how a name was entered, and to the fact that larger corporations often trade 
under many names, and register patents in business names which are hard to track down.  
The first set of challenges involved the typographical differences in how names were 
entered. Small differences in how an owner's name is entered mean that entries for the same 
owner can be separated by entries for other owners. Thus spaces and punctuation, as well as 
abbreviations become meaningful, and increase the time needed to group together patents 
owned by a single entity. In addition, especially for overseas companies, where the data 
entry staff are clearly not familiar with the language, companies can be entered with the 
                                                 
55  Little is known about such patents, but possibilities include that the individuals work in the company or 
have agreed a joint approach to developing the patented “invention”.  
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word "company" first, rather than the company name. Thus AG, Aktiebolag, 
Aktiengesellschaft, AS, Aktiengesellschaft, Gmbh, Kabushiki Kaisha, KK, Oy, Société 
Anonyme all featured as initial words in a company name. In addition some companies 
were occasionally entered with the word "the" as in "The Gillette company". Companies 
with initials as part of the company name were a particular problem as spaces and 
punctuation changed the order of listing, and differently entered names had to be re-sorted 
and grouped together. Where patents were taken out in by different branches of the same 
company, for example, 'Aventis CropScience GmbH' and 'Aventis Cropscience S.A.', these 
entries can be separated by entries for other companies, and have to be re-sorted.  
Beyond these straightforward cleaning exercises was the challenge of companies taking out 
patents in a range of company names, even though the ownership was common. Substantial 
effort has been put into tracking down common ownership for the more frequent patenters, 
especially those that are among the top 100 US patenters as well as among the top 100 
Australian patenters. However a more complete exercise would require access to business 
name registers, which lie in the private domain and are not cheap to access. 
Because of the initial intent to compare the volume of patenting of frequent patentees 
between the two six-year time periods, frequent patenters were initially defined on the 
purely arbitrary basis of those with 10 or more patents in any one 6-year period. On the 
basis of this decision-rule, 1,344 frequent patenters were identified. However the list 
excludes companies with less than ten patents in either six-year period. Thus companies 
with nine patents in each period could be excluded, yet such companies would have more 
patents than some identified in the listing. The decision-rule means that the clear cut-off in 
the identification of frequent patenters occurs at 19 patents in the twelve-year period—most 
such companies have been identified.56 There are 908 of them.  
 
                                                 
56  Of course, to the extent that variations in company names have not yet been picked up, there may be 
more frequent patenters than are identified here.  
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Table A1 Granted Australian patents by file and grant years: 1990 - 2007 
Grant year  File 
year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 total 
1990* 3688 5638 2173 292 29 7 12 2 4 3 0 1 1 1   12,166 
1991 366 3708 4903 1843 350 33 12 17 3 1 2 1 0 1   11,242 
1992 1 440 3494 4306 2111 459 75 11 4 4 1 0 1 1 0 1 10,909 
1993  6 464 2547 4138 2661 969 54 13 6 3 1 1 2 0 1 10,866 
1994   8 339 1868 4455 4132 661 39 12 9 6 3 1 1 1 11,535 
1995    7 215 1227 6321 3846 693 40 21 8 3 7 2 1 12,391 
1996     1 325 2252 6256 4320 828 58 20 7 7 1 1 14,076 
1997      7 599 1652 6496 5192 1116 91 20 15 6 4 15,198 
1998       48 614 1372 6002 6280 1874 167 19 11 10 16,397 
1999        24 505 1183 4878 6564 2868 345 38 16 16,421 
2000         16 400 1019 3304 6351 3756 847 125 15,818 
2001          8 285 873 2334 4333 4242 2309 14,384 
2002           8 239 743 1552 2332 3882 8,756 
2003            18 214 672 1166 1882 3,952 
2004             17 220 562 1141 1,940 
2005              38 188 539 765 
2006               12 196 208 
2007                15 15 
                  
Total 4055 9792 11042 9334 8712 9174 14420 13137 13465 13679 13680 13000 12730 10970 9408 10124 177,039 
Source: Data on standard patent grants from filings in 1990 and subsequent years, provided by IPAustralia. 
Note: As these are file year data, total grants by grant year (column totals) are incomplete for years up to around 1994 / 1995. Total granted from filings in 
years 1990-2001 is 161,403. 
* Four patents from the 1990 cohort were granted in 1990, and 311 in 1991. Two patents from the 1991 cohort were granted in 1991. These data are not shown because of 
space restrictions.  
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Table A2 Proportion of Australian patents granted by years from filing 
Proportion of patents granted in:   
Years after filing File 
year Year 
of 
filing 
Year 
after 
filing 
2 3 4 5 6 7  
Percent 
granted 
to date 
Number 
granted 
from 
cohort 
           
1990 0% 3% 30% 46% 18% 2%  12,166 
1991 0% 3% 33% 44% 16% 3%  11,242 
1992 0% 4% 32% 39% 19% 4% 1%  10,909 
1993 0% 4% 23% 38% 24% 9%  10,866 
1994 0% 3% 16% 39% 36% 6%  11,535 
1995 0% 2% 10% 51% 31% 6% 88% 12,391 
1996 0% 2% 16% 44% 31% 6% 94% 14,076 
1997 4% 11% 43% 34% 7% 1%  89% 15,198 
1998 0% 4% 8% 37% 38% 11% 1%   91% 16,397 
       
1999 0% 3% 7% 30% 40% 17% 2%  83% 16,421 
2000 0% 3% 6% 21% 40% 24% 5% 1% 72% 15,818 
2001 0% 2% 6% 16% 30% 29% 16%   63% 14,384 
        
2002 0% 3% 8% 18% 27% 44%   39% 8,756 
2003 0% 5% 17% 30% 48%   18% 3,952 
2004 1% 11% 29% 59%    8% 1,940 
2005 5% 25% 70%     3% 765 
2006 6% 94%      1% 208 
2007 
100
%       
 
15 
Note: These calculations are based on calendar years not elapsed years. That is among patents filed in 1997 
and granted, 43% were granted in 1999.  
 Application data was to calculate grant rates are from Table P30(Feb08) available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about/statistics.shtml (accessed 29 July 2008). 
 It is evident from the column on the percent of filings (applications) granted that the cohorts for 
the last six years (2002 on) are substantially incomplete, and that many additional patents may 
yet be granted from patents filed in the years 1999, 2000 and 2001.  
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Table A3: Top 100 US corporate patentees: 1969 to 2006 
 
 HQ AU rank 
# patents 
1969 to 
1984 
# patents 
1985 to 
2006 
# patents 
1969 to 
2006 
1 IBM US 107       9,794       39,377  49,152  
2 GENERAL ELECTRIC US 68     15,480       17,768  33,248  
3 CANON JP 10       3,738       28,659  32,397 
4 HITACHI JP 93       6,933       22,441  29,374 
5 TOSHIBA  JP 663       4,412       21,406  25,818 
6 PANASONIC # JP 46       3,689       21,004  24,693 
7 PHILIPS # NL 71       7,494       14,838  22,332 
8 NEC JP 5       1,961       19,682  21,643 
9 HONEYWELL # US 44       11,507        9,882  21,389 
10 EASTMAN KODAK US 85       5,907       15,139  21,046 
11 SONY JP 25       2,536       17,974  20,510 
12 MITSUBISHI DENKI  JP 62       2,021       18,185  20,206 
13 SIEMENS  DE 33       6,838       11,800  18,638 
14 MOTOROLA US 29       3,581       14,992  18,573 
15 FUJITSU  JP 65       1,415       16,402  17,817 
16 DU PONT # US 11       7,826        9,274  17,100 
17 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS KR 30             2       16,819  16,821 
18 FUJI PHOTO FILM JP 788       3,510       13,190  16,700 
19 HEWLETT-PACKARD # US 345       1,022       15,616  16,638 
20 AT&T  US 58       9,721        6,875  16,597 
21 XEROX  JP *       5,343       10,327  15,670 
22 DOW CHEMICAL # US 19       10,136        5,011  15,147 
23 EXXON-MOBIL # US 7       7,999        6,412  14,411 
24 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS US 836       3,350       11,039  14,389 
25 BAYER DE 12       6,877        7,377  14,254 
26 MICRON TECHNOLOGY US  --             1       13,953  13,954 
27 GENERAL MOTORS US 210       6,963        6,866  13,829 
28 INTEL US 600         190       12,527  12,717 
29 3M # US 6       3,386        9,110  12,496 
30 BASF # DE 14       3,865        8,466  12,332 
31 ROBERT BOSCH  DE 57       3,422        8,759  12,181 
32 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC US 304       8,438        3,537  11,975 
33 NOVARTIS # CH 21       7,273        4,192  11,465 
34 ALCATEL-LUCENT FR 8              0       10,352  10,352 
35 KONICA-MINOLTA  JP  --       2,158        8,084  10,242 
36 WYETH # US 28       6,946        3,292  10,238 
37 HONDA MOTOR JP 191       1,457        8,664  10,121 
38 SHARP JP 299       1,023        8,767  9,790 
39 CONOCOPHILLIPS # US 72       6,863        2,542  9,405 
40 RICOH  JP  --       1,808        7,158  8,968 
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Table A3: Top 100 US corporate patentees: grants by filing year  (contd) 
 
 HQ AU rank 
# patents 
1969 to 
1984 
# patents 
1985 to 
2006 
# patents 
1969 to 
2006 
41 FORD MOTOR # US 597       2,768        6,167  8,935 
42 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES US  --         138        8,576  8,714 
43 PROCTER & GAMBLE # US 3       2,263        6,400  8,663 
44 NISSAN MOTOR  JP  --       3,276        4,802  8,078 
45 HOECHST (Sanofi Aventis)  FR 2       4,003        3,952  7,955 
46 RCA (defunct) US  *       7,218           670  7,888 
47 TOYOTA JIDOSHA JP 175       2,492        5,194  7,686 
48 DENSO  JP 815       1,139        6,493  7,632 
49 SHELL OIL  NL/UK 17       3,477        3,648  7,125 
50 SEIKO EPSON JP 800           33        7,074  7,107 
51 UNISYS  US  --       5,022        1,978  7,000 
52 ERICSSON  # SE 1         468        6,068  6,536 
53 CATERPILLAR  US 89       3,183        3,121  6,304 
54 PFIZER # US 16       2,263        4,000  6,263 
55 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES US 225       3,138        2,872  6,010 
56 MICROSOFT  US *            -          5,658  5,658 
57 OLYMPUS OPTICAL  JP  --       1,731        3,923  5,654 
58 MONSANTO  US 64       4,273        1,349  5,622 
59 SUN MICROSYSTEMS US 186             4        5,616  5,620 
60 BOEING  US  --       1,652        3,885  5,539 
61 NIKON  JP  --         924        4,490  5,414 
62 MERCK SHARP & DOHME  US 13       2,787        4,331  7,118 
63 ICI UK 80       3,530        1,802  5,332 
64 DAIMLER # DE 422       1,480        3,674  5,154 
65 HUGHES AIRCRAFT US 96       2,106        3,046  5,152 
66 HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE INC. # CH 23       2,476        2,619  5,095 
67 HALLIBURTON # US 86       2,013        2,989  5,002 
68 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL US 496       3,313        1,525  4,838 
69 AGFA # BE  --       2,517        2,181  4,698 
70 SANYO ELECTRIC  JP 251         368        4,307  4,675 
71 EATON  US 63       1,632        2,959  4,591 
72 SUMITOMO CHEMICAL JP 59       1,724        2,796  4,520 
73 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB # US 24       2,098        2,406  4,504 
74 TEXACO US 244       3,110        1,309  4,419 
75 YAMAHA # JP  --         329        3,816  4,145 
76 CORNING  US 53       1,719        2,345  4,064 
77 THOMSON  # FR 277       1,707        2,355  4,062 
78 TRW  US 481       1,830        2,197  4,027 
79 MURATA MANUFACTURING  JP  --         228        3,793  4,021 
80 GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER US 75       1,899        2,049  3,948 
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Table A3: Top 100 US corporate patentees: grants by filing year  (contd) 
 
 HQ AU rank 
# patents 
1969 to 
1984 
# patents 
1985 to 
2006 
# patents 
1969 to 
2006 
81 TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR TW  --            -          3,937  3,937 
82 ELI LILLY US 32       1,671        2,184  3,855 
83 SUMITOMO ELECTRIC JP 48         546        3,302  3,848 
84 APPLIED MATERIALS US  --           23        3,823  3,846 
85 PPG US 81       2,711        1,115  3,826 
86 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES  DE  --            -          3,813  3,813 
87 KIMBERLY-CLARK # US 15         620        3,190  3,810 
88 AMP (Tyco) US 260       2,130        1,535  3,665 
89 OKI ELECTRIC JP  --         207        3,362  3,569 
90 FMC US 115       2,376        1,186  3,562 
91 YAZAKI JP 414           27        3,534  3,561 
92 NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR US  --         443        3,102  3,545 
93 GTE PRODUCTS ?US?  --       2,546           976  3,522 
94 HYUNDAI ELECTRONICS # KR  --            -          3,517  3,517 
95 BROTHER KOGYO JP  --         180        3,335  3,515 
96 GLAXOSMITHKLINE # UK 22       1,661        1,848  3,509 
97 LSI LOGIC US  --       3        3,474  3,477 
98 FUJI XEROX JP  *       391        3,065  3,456 
99 LG ELECTRONICS KR 94            -          3,431  3,431 
100 L’OREAL FR 47       703         2,714  3,417 
       
 Total    299,087 711,220 1,010,307 
 Percent of patents to 
organisations   31% 33% 33% 
 Percent of total patents granted   29% 28% 28% 
 
Source:  USPTO website (http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_at.htm#PartB, accessed 6 
March 2008). Part B.  
Notes: Australian rank data refer to the period 1990-2001. 
  # Subsidiaries have been aggregated.  
  * In Australian list of frequent patenters, but <20 patents over 12 year period 1990-2001.  
  -- Not in list of Australian frequent patenters.  
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Table A4: Companies entering and leaving US top 100 patentees list 
Company name HQ US rank 
AU 
rank main field of activity 
Grants from filings 
in 1990-2001 
Companies in top 100 in 1969-2006, but not in 1990-2001 (leavers) US AU 
Westinghouse Electric US 32 304 electrics/diversified 1,453 60 
Conoco-Phillips  US 39 72 oil 1,535 228 
RCA (defunct) US 46  * electronics 0 15 
Unisys  US 51  -- IT (mainframes) 1,365 -- 
Monsanto  US 58 64 chemicals 887 260 
ICI UK 63 80 chemicals 985 207 
Rockwell International US 68 496 auto/diversified 893 37 
Bristol-Myers Squibb  US 73 24 pharmaceuticals 1,488 642 
Texaco US 74 244 oil 724 73 
Thomson   FR 77 277 defence 1,559 66 
Goodyear US 80 75 tires and rubber 1,315 219 
PPG US 85 81 glass/paint 548 205 
Infineon Technologies  DE 86  -- semiconductors 1,551 -- 
AMP (Tyco) US 88 260 electronics 549 69 
FMC US 90 115 chemicals 810 146 
GTE Products ?US? 93  -- telecommunications? 283 -- 
GlaxoSmithKline  UK 96 22 pharmaceuticals 1,436 702 
Companies in top 100 in 1990-2001, but not in 1969-2006 (entrants)   
Abbott Laboratories US 92 35 pharma 1,717 416 
Nokia FI 60 18 telecoms 2,464 809 
Medtronic  US 81 81 medical devices 1,932 204 
Shin-Etsu Chemical JP 97 874 (semiconductor) chemicals 1632 20 
Seagate Technology US 62 --- IT (storage) 2453 -- 
United 
Microelectronics TW 63 --- semiconductors 2434 -- 
Cisco Technology US 79 --- IT (networking) 1942 -- 
Semiconductor Energy 
Lab JP 83 --- semiconductors 1928 -- 
Compaq US 86 780 IT (PCs) 1849 22 
Delphi Technologies US 88 850 electronics (mobile) 1769 20 
Pioneer (Electronic) JP 94 --- electronics 1670 -- 
Alps Electric JP 98 --- electronics 1628 -- 
Hon Hai Precision TW 99 --- IT; electronics 1613 -- 
Tokyo Electron JP 100 --- semiconductors 1608 -- 
Nortel Networks  CA 53 228 telecoms 2710 75 
Asashi Kasei  JP 67 --- diversified 2351 -- 
Whitaker  US 93 770 aerospace; networking 1694 23 
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Table A5 Top 100 Australian patenters, not in top 100 US 
Company name HQ AU rank 
US 
rank main field of activity 
Grants from filings 
in 1990-2001 
Chemical, pharmaceutical and related  AU US 
Johnson & Johnson US 4 184 mixed, chemicals 1314 805 
Unilever  NL/UK 9 -- mixed chemicals 1019 -- 
AstraZeneca SE/UK 20 -- pharma 777 -- 
GlaxoSmithKline  US 22 111 pharma 702 1436 
Bristol-Myers Squibb US 24 109 pharma 642 1488 
Nestle  CH 26 173 foodstuffs 579 845 
Rhodia [Rhone-Poulenc] FR 27 -- chemicals/vetinary 556 -- 
Schering   31 129 pharma 462 1230 
Pharmacia & Upjohn US 36 278 pharma 402 164 
Ciba Specialty Chemicals CH 38 156 chemicals 390 937 
Linde DE 39 -- industrial gases 388 -- 
Colgate Palmolive  US 40 159 personal care 380 925 
Rohm & Haas  US 41 138 chemicals 362 1116 
Syngenta  CH 43 -- pharma 342 -- 
Boehringer DE 48 246 pharma 330 455 
Henkel  DE 53 152 personal care / cleaning 309 976 
Akzo  NL 54 170 
chemicals / specialty 
(paints) 302 884 
Servier FR 55 -- pharma 298 -- 
Monsanto  US 63 169 chemicals / agricultural  260 887 
Merck (DE) DE 65 154 pharma 255 951 
Lubrizol  US 69 249 specialty chemicals 230 437 
ConocoPhillips US 71 106 oil 228 1535 
Novo Nordisk DK 78 153 pharma 208 960 
ICI UK 79 151 chemicals 207 985 
PPG Industries US 80 228 glass  205 548 
Dow Corning  US 83 136 specialty chemicals 194 1171 
Covidien [Tyco health] 
BM/
US 88 161 pharma; medical devices 188 924 
Owens Corning US 91 285 fibreglass 186 46 
Allergan US 95 -- pharma 178 -- 
S.C. Johnson & Son US 100 -- cleaning products 169 -- 
Sector sub-total     12062 19705 
% of AU or US top 100 patents   25.7% 3.9% 
     
Electronics, computing, telecommunications and related
Qualcomm  US 34 112 telecoms 434 1407  
British Telecom…s  UK 37 188 telecoms 392 782 
Daikin Industries  JP 98 208 electronics  171 675 
Sector sub-total     997 2864 
% of AU or US top 100 patents   2.1% 0.6% 
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Table A5 Top 100 Australian patenters, not in top 100 US (continued) 
Company name HQ AU rank 
US 
rank 
main field of 
activity 
Grants from filings 
in 1990-2001 
Instruments, light machinery AU US 
Baxter US 42 162 
medical 
instruments 343 919 
Becton Dickinson US 51 135 medical devices 316 1179 
Amgen  US 60 -- orthopaedics 264 -- 
Silverbrook Research AU 76 242 printers 211 471 
Smith & Nephew  UK 77 -- medical devices 209 -- 
Alcon CH 82 -- ophthalmology 200 -- 
Moore North America US 97 -- printing 178 -- 
Sector sub-total     1721 2569 
% of AU or US top 100 patents   3.7% 0.5% 
Diversified, and heavy engineering     
Illinois Tool Works US 49 119 
diversified 
(fasteners) 328 1337  
Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries JP 68 125 heavy machinery 231 1277  
Deere & Company US 73 142 heavy equipment 222 1082  
Westinghouse Air 
Brake  US 75 -- brakes 213 -- 
Raytheon  US 86 118 defence/aerospace 191 1343  
Outokumpu  FI 92 -- stainless steel 183 -- 
ABB AB CH 99 292 power; automation 170 294  
Sector sub-total     1538 5333 
% of AU or US top 100 patents   3.3% 1.0% 
Miscellaneous    
Uni-Charm  JP 44 -- hygiene 337 -- 
Tetra Laval. CH 50 -- packaging 318 -- 
Baker Hughes  US 59 126 oil services 265 1275 
Schlumberger  US 66 130 oil services 247 1209 
Sealed Air  US 72 -- packaging 223 -- 
Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber  US 74 123 tires and rubber 219 1315 
DSM IP Assets  NL 90 -- 
life and materials 
sciences 186 -- 
Sector sub-total     1795 3799 
% of AU or US top 100 patents   3.8% 0.7% 
Source: Calculated from all standard patents granted by end 2007 from applications filed in the years 1990 to 
2001. See Appendix Table 2 for source for US data. 
Notes: Wholly owned and majority owned (over 50 percent) subsidiaries are combined. 
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Table A6 Top 100 US patenters, not in top 100 Australian 
Company name HQ AU rank 
US 
rank main field of activity 
Grants from filings 
in 1990-2001 
Chemical, pharmaceutical and related  US AU 
Shin-Etsu Chemical JP 874 97 
chemicals (for 
semiconductors) 1632 20 
Sector sub-total     1632 20 
% of AU or US top 100 patents   0.3% 0.0% 
Electronics, computing, telecommunications and related   
IBM US 107 1 IT 31182 154 
Toshiba  JP 663 7 electronics 13738 27 
Hewlett-Packard  US 345 14 IT 10866 52 
Micron Technology US --- 16 semiconductors 9608 -- 
Intel  US 600 18 IT (software) 9152 30 
Texas Instruments  US 836 21 semiconductors, electronics 7824 21 
Advanced Micro 
Devices US --- 23 semiconductors 6808 -- 
Sharp  JP 299 25 electronics 6098 61 
Ricoh JP --- 35 electronics, imaging 4653 -- 
Seiko Epson  JP 800 37 electronics 4459 22 
Sun Microsystems US 186 38 IT (diversified) 4432 89 
Microsoft  US 896 40 IT (software) 4347 19 
Hyundai Electronics KR --- 45 electronics 3428 -- 
Applied Materials US --- 48 semiconductors 2946 -- 
Sanyo Electric  JP 251 49 
semiconductors, batteries, 
phones 2894 72 
Yamaha JP --- 50 
electronics, musical 
instruments 2816 -- 
Murata 
Manufacturing JP --- 51 electronic components 2784 -- 
LSI Logic US --- 55 semiconductors 2642 -- 
Taiwan 
Semiconductor  TW --- 59 semiconductors 2500 -- 
Seagate Technology US --- 62 IT (storage) 2453 -- 
United 
Microelectronics TW --- 63 semiconductors 2434 -- 
National 
Semiconductor US --- 73 semiconductors 2206 -- 
Oki Electric JP --- 74 semiconductors 2154 -- 
Cisco Technology US --- 79 IT (networking) 1942 -- 
Semiconductor 
Energy Lab JP --- 83 semiconductors 1928 -- 
Compaq US 780 86 IT (PCs) 1849 22 
Delphi Technologies US 850 88 electronics (mobile) 1769 20 
Pioneer (Electronic) JP --- 94 electronics 1670 -- 
Alps Electric JP --- 98 electronics 1628 -- 
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Table A6 Top 100 US patenters, not in top 100 Australian (continued) 
Company name HQ AU rank 
US 
rank main field of activity 
Grants from 
filings in 1990-
Electronics, computing, telecommunications and related (continued) US AU 
Hon Hai Precision TW --- 99 IT; electronics 1613 -- 
Tokyo Electron JP --- 100 semiconductors 1608 -- 
Nortel Networks  CA 228 53 telecoms 2710 75 
Sector sub-total     159141 664 
% of AU or US top 100 patents   31.1% 1.4% 
Instruments; light machinery   
Xerox  JP 1149 19 copiers; printers 8031 14 
Fuji Photo Film  JP 788 20 photographic equipment 7865 22 
Konica-Minolta JP --- 31 cameras, copiers, printers 5496 -- 
Nikon  JP --- 44 (optics) precision instruments  3732 -- 
Olympus Optical JP --- 47 (optics) precision instruments  2948 -- 
Fuji Xerox  JP 1021 64 copiers; printers 2378 16 
Brother Kogyo JP --- 72 printers; machinery 2246 -- 
AGFA  BE --- 95 optics/imaging 1644 -- 
Sector sub-total     34340 52  
% of AU or US top 100 patents   6.7% 
0.1
% 
Diversified, and heavy engineering   
Honda Giken  JP 191 33 autos, diversified 4900 85 
Ford Motor  US 597 39 autos 4421 30 
General Motors  US 210 43 autos, financial services 3792 80 
Toyota Jidosha  JP 175 46 autos 3138 94 
Yazaki  JP 414 52 auto equipment 2774 44 
DaimlerChrysler  DE 422 54 autos 2692 42 
Nissan Motor JP --- 57 autos 2556 -- 
Denso  JP 815 41 auto components 4022 61 
Asashi Kasei  JP --- 67 diversified 2351 -- 
TRW  US 481 85 defence/diversified 1863 38 
Boeing US --- 87 defence/aerospace 1838 -- 
United Technologies  US 225 90 diversified 1726 76 
Whitaker  US 770 93 aerospace; data networking 1694 23 
Sector sub-total     37767 573  
% of AU or US top 100 patents   7.4% 
1.2
% 
Source: Calculated from the USPTO table "Historic Data, All Technologies (Utility Patents) Report", Part B 
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/ taf/h_at.htm, accessed 4 March 2008). See Appendix 
Table 1 for source for Australian data.  
Notes: Wholly owned and majority owned (over 50 percent) subsidiaries are combined. 
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Acronyms and Country Codes 
EPO European Patent Office 
GATT General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (first signed 1947) 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IPAustralia Intellectual Property Australia  
(includes the Australian Patent, Designs and Trade Marks Offices) 
IPC International Patent Classification 
ISR International Search Report (part of PCT processes) 
PCT Patent Cooperation Treaty 
R&D research and development 
Special 301 1988 amendment to US International Trade Act (which requires 
imposition of US trade sanctions in respect of “unfair” overseas 
intellectual property laws) 
TRIPS "Trade-Related" Intellectual Property Treaty 
USPTO United States Patent and Trade Mark Office 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation 
WTO World Trade Organisation (replaced GATT Secretariat in 1995) 
 
 
Country codes 
Patent systems use a set of two-letter codes to identify nations. Those used in this paper are: 
 
Code Country Code Country Code Country 
AU Australia DK Denmark NL Netherlands 
BE Belgium FI Finland SE Sweden 
BM Bermuda FR France TW Taiwan 
CH Switzerland JP Japan UK United Kingdom* 
DE Germany KR Korea US USA 
* Within the global patent system the code GB is used for the United Kingdom, but their patent system 
also covers Northern Ireland, so here the technically correct identifier UK is preferred. 
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